Theology Department
St. Stephen's
Episcopal School
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5. Compare secular and religious. Where does humanism fit in? 62 -- P.T. uses lots of "ifs" w/ regard to Humanism. So be on your guard. He says that Humanism implies faith, faith means the state of being ultimately concerned about the ultimate; an Humanist "makes man the measure of his own spiritual life, because the divine is manifest in the human & the U.C. of man is the "true man, man of the idea, in his essence." 63 In this case the Humanist's U.C. is man, which is the ultimate in finite reality, just as sacramental faith sees the ultimate in a piece of reality or as mystical faith finds in the depth of man the place of the infinite. But the sacramental and mystical types try to reach beyond man & his world; Humanism stays w/in those limits. Thus Humanism is called "secular," while sacramental & mystical types are "religious.
64-- "Secular" is a synonym with Eliade's "Profane." But if a "secular" person has an U.C., they are w/in "the community of the faithful. It has an "ontological" aspect which is romantic and conservative & points to the "infinite in the finite," and sees the presence of the ultimate in the existing forms of nature and Human history; so one would see "the holy in the flower as it grows, in the animal as it moves, a special nature/culture/system. so it is a "secularized sacramental faith; the divine is a given here and now." It can become empty, almost inevitably does, and people return to religious forms of faith. The "secular" has a "moral" aspect which is progressive and utopian.
6. What are the three moral types of faith? What examples from three traditions does Tillich provide? Do they make sense or not? Why? 65 --
1. Juristic, as seen in Talmudic Judaism & Islam. There are laws, which are gifts as well as commands (that's a big idea), and which make life possible, satisfying, and the real faith (66) is in the ORDER he described. And so the conflict between religions is "a conflict between EXPRESSIONS of our U.C. A Muslim has faith in Mohammed's revelation as the U.C., mainly ritual & social laws, the latter of which address "what ought to be."
2. Conventional, as in Confucian China, in which a basically secular system of unconditional rules is in place, manifesting the law of the universe (li & LI, like sva-dharma & DHARMA). Thus setting the stage for Buddhism & Taoism, with sacramental & mystical aspects, and later for secular communism.
3. Ethical, as in Jewish prophets (including Jesus?) -- 67: Old Testament Judaism, in which the experience of the holy has never overwhelmed "the holiness of 'what ought to be.'" Obeying the law of justice is a way of reaching God. That obedience is the act of faith, a "continuous actualization of the U.C. connected to the humdrum concerns of daily life. The Ultimate. is present in the smallest activity (ref. Zen, chopping wood & drawing water). And the peculiar, majestic thing about the O.T. prophets was that their message constantly kept the drive toward the sacramental in perspective, preventing it from overwhelming the moral element. So justice has to be present, or in the view of Judaism, the U.C. is not Ultimate.
Connect all this to the founding of the U.S., the concerns w/ peasantry or bourgeois society, proletariat, the fight against the bondage of sacramentalism & for justice. So a humanist moral faith has dominated the last two centuries, with revolutions, etc. So "it is almost ridiculous to speak of a loss of faith in the Western secular world....." because it has secular faith which makes religions defensive, but which is a faith in a U.C.
7. Why does Roman Catholicism call itself a system which unites the most divergent elements of man's religious and cultural life?
8. Where does Spirit fit in the unity of divergent types of faith? Tillich criticizes Catholicism & Protestantism regarding Spirit. Why?

2. So faith & reason relate to each other, & that can be distorted. How?
78: People tend to be estranged from who they really are -- true nature. They forget, are distracted, make bad choices for the wrong reasons. A revelation is an event that overcomes what P.T. calls the estrangement of faith & reason & the relationship between the two. A revelation is "when an Ultimate Concern grasps the human mind & creates a community in which this concern expresses itself in symbols of action, imagination, & thought."
79: At such a time a person's "total structure as a rational being is grasped & changed by the revelatory manifestation of an Ultimate Concern." But the revelation is to a person of "corrupted faith & corrupted rationality" -- and the corruption is "conquered but not removed," and enters the new revelatory experience. Through corruption faith becomes idolatrous: the medium is confused with the message & its sender, the Ultimate. And through corruption reason is deprived of ecstatic power & the ability to transcend itself in the Ultimate's direction. And so corruption distorts the relationship of faith & reason, so that faith is just a "preliminary concern" (as opposed to an ultimate concern) that gets in the way of the preliminary concerns of reason to the extent that reason, which is finite by its nature, is elevated to ultimacy.
So, revelatory events are the "decisive battles" in the ongoing fight between faith & the corrupting of faith. The war would be over with a final revelation, which Christianity claims to be; that claim can be tested as we watch
Human history.
Are there any problems with this scheme? Are we having fun yet?

3. Science & faith have no right or power to interfere w/ each other. Why?
They are concerned with different things to some extent, and have different rules. 81: Science tries to describe & explain the structures & relations in the universe to the extent they can be tested quantitatively. A scientific truth is preliminary, open to change, provisional, uncertain, but still "true" until proven otherwise. Thus it is not dogmatic or absolute. 82: Any conflict between S. & F. reflects a lack of awareness of the valid dimensions of each. Examples? The reaction of Christians against Copernicus, Galileo, & modern astronomy. They were taking a symbol -- the Bible -- literally & ultimately. And if a physicist focuses on the subatomic principles, components, movements while denying that there is something "real" in the quality of life and mind, they've expressed a faith in a meaningless mechanism, which Christian faith correctly opposes. Science & faith are two unconnected spheres. They don't overlap or conflict. And theologians shouldn't use science to confirm truth of faith. They are two separate dimensions; scientific discoveries can neither confirm nor deny faith.
4. Why is it hard to identify the purely historical in the Bible?
86: historical truth is factual truth & separate from poetic, mythic truths. And faith cannot guarantee factual truth. 87: The Bible combines historical, legendary, & mythological elements in such a way they can't be separated. They "truth of faith" cannot be dependent on the historical truth of stories & legends in which faith expressed itself. Faith is distorted (disastrously) if it requires belief in the historical validity of Bible stories.
5. What can faith say -- and not say -- regardless of the Bible's historical content? 88: Faith can say that
* something of Ultimate Concern has happened in Humanistory because the question of the ultimate in being and meaning is involved;
* the O.T. law of Moses has unconditional validity for those who are grasped by it regardless of the role of the historical Moses;
* Jesus in the N.T. represents a reality with saving power for those who are grasped by it, regardless of the identifiable connection to the historical Jesus of Nazareth;
* Faith can ascertain its own foundation, but not the historical conditions enabling key historical figures to become matters of ultimate concern.
89: Faith does not include historical knowledge about the way in which this event took place. Thus it can't be shaken by historical research, even if the findings seem critical of the traditions. It's independent of historical truth.
Thus the faithful are liberated -- from a burden they cannot carry after the demands of scholarly honesty have shaped their conscience.
6. How do philosophy & faith express the ultimate? Key difference?
90: Philosophical truth is truth about the structure of being; it's an attempt to answer the most general questions about the nature of reality & human existence, and find universal categories in which "being" is experienced. On the other hand, the "truth of faith" is truth about one's ultimate concern. 91: Philosophical Truth consists in true concepts concerning the ultimate; the truth of faith consists in true symbols concerning the ultimate. Why does Philosophical Truth use concepts & faith use symbols if they are trying to express the same ultimate? Because the ultimate isn't the same for each. In Philosophical Truth, it's a detached description of a basic structure in which the Ultimate manifests itself; In Faith it's "an involved expression of concern about the meaning of the ultimate for the faithful. "But the difference can't be maintained, because the philosopher has an Ultimate Concern, hidden or open. 94: "Where there is a philosophy there is expression of an ultimate concern..."

7. All faith has a weakness. What is it? 97: The weakness is the ease with which it becomes idolatrous. And Calvin said "the human mind is a factory constantly producing idols "-- in every faith. They all have the tendency to elevate concrete symbols to absolute validity. And so the true test of the truth of faith is that it must imply an element of self-negation. What does self-negation mean?

8. What symbol is most adequate? 97: The symbol that expresses the Ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy. An example is the Cross for Christians, and the idea that Jesus could not have been the Christ without sacrificing himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ. 96: The symbol that is alive, which is to say, adequate in its expression of an Ultimate Concern so that it creates reply, action, communication. 97: And, a symbol is "true" if it expresses what is really ultimate -- and thus not idolatrous.

9. Can Christian faith become idolatrous? How/how not? P.T. says that the Christian faith can become idolatrous, for example, if Christians try to hold onto Jesus the Christ while not accepting Jesus the crucified. What does he mean by that? He goes on to say that the Ultimate Concern is Christ Jesus, seen crucified. And the Ultimate is unconditionally manifest, and any truth of faith is a yes/no judgment.

10. In the Reformation, what divided the Church? The reformers contention that no institution or church had the right to put itself in the place of the Ultimate. In fact, it's the truth of the church that is judged by the Ultimate.

K. Pages 99-117
1. Why does faith require participation and separation? P.T. says that we are "grasped by" an Ultimate Concern, and that one cannot be concerned about it -- the object of one's concern -- without participating in, and with, it (99). What does this mean? Among other things, P.T. seems to be trying to get away from the idea that people are passively responding to a U.C.; perhaps they "realize" what their U.C. is as much as they are "grasped by" it, and in either case it's not a "choice." It's a new understanding. In any case, the U.C. drives one to act a certain way -- action is part of the deal. Thinking, talking, moving, working, playing, etc., in a different way, and/or for different reasons. In this way, there is "no faith without participation!" and participation is what leads to certainty (100). It is seen most strongly, in every tradition, among mystics.
In the same way P.T. says there is no such thing as faith without separation, which is the opposite of participation. By separation he seems to mean an independent status -- ownership, possessiveness, don't apply -- which is directly related to his earlier exploration of doubt & faith. P.T. is trying to be characteristically honest in describing what he sees -- the existence & ability of humans to understand are finite and can lead to occasional estrangement. It's the separation that creates the "space" that allows and requires "movement" -- which is why faith is "dynamic." Think of Otto's believer, attracted to the Mystery. Of Arjuna, spellbound and drawn toward Krishna in Chapter 11. Of the original audience for the Tao Te Ching, trying desperately to find the Way, and to walk in it. Of the urgency of Christ in the Gospel of John, demanding his listeners choose. All of these people are "separated" -- and what they are separated from varies in its specific description according to time, place, culture.
So there is always this tendency in two directions -- participating, and separating, and they are intertwined, even interdependent -- a visual symbol of which might be the yin/yang circle, with its implicit message that the two sides must be seen as aspects of an ever-whirling, complete, integrated process. P.T. says that not only is there is always a tension between participating in the Ultimate Concern & being separated from it, but that this is a requirement of faith! So certainty and doubt are in a dance together.

2. What do pharasaism & fanaticism mean? What is their catalyst? P.T. says pharisaism and fanaticism are symptoms of repressed doubt, and repression can never overcome doubt (101). Doubt is their catalyst.

3. What does courage mean, for Tillich? Courage acknowledges the presence of doubt, but interprets doubt as an expression of the finite nature of courage & affirming the content of the U.C. (?). Because it is risky, it shuns the false safety of "unshakable faith" and immovable conviction. To be creative requires risk. It is risky, courageous, and not always certain to be a Christian, for example. Note that P.T. knows he's not describing many or perhaps even most Christians, but is describing for whom faith is alive and dynamic. (102) See also pg. 103

4. How can symbols & education affect one's life of faith? Symbols hold & embody the power of the original organic, moving, evolving concern and the related faith. Conventional "faith" is often dead, a shell of what was. But P.T. says faith can be simply a traditional attitude, more potential faith than actual faith, handed down from parents to children for generations, which is what he means by "education." Such education "mediates" faith -- what does that mean? -- in such a way that it might be "tradition" but not "alive" -- again, the notions of participation and separation, seen from a different angle. Thus education can, at worst, lead to a sense of emptiness, or cynicism regarding symbols and a life of faith that have lost meaning as they became ideas and behaviors functioning more like software in a person's brain than like an aspect of the organic nature of one's life.

5. If we have faith, what idolatrous elements can occur within it? Our own wishful thinking, staying in an obsolete tradition because of social pressure, New Age crystals & channeling etc., doing "religious" things in hopes of gaining something (magic), or confusing of the messenger/medium with the Ultimate and the message the Ultimate is sending.

6. What are bodily and mental aspects of a life of faith? One becomes a healthy, functioning, integrated whole, because the U.C. gives depth, direction, unity; all other concerns are subordinate to the U.C. This assertion "would be absurd if faith were what it is in its distorted meaning, the belief in things w/o evidence." But the assertion is clear, even obvious, if faith is U.C. (105). Faith is "the centered movement of the whole personality toward something of ultimate meaning and significance -- and thus it is not purely intellectual, emotional, in one's head, unconscious, etc. Faith is a way of living that unites all the aspects that thinkers have typically divided human beings up into, e.g., body, spirit, consciousness, physicality, etc. Faith is a passionate way of thinking, which P.T. means the body is involved (106-107). Our unconscious helps select symbols & types of faith. In turn, life is concentrated, focused, as the consciousness has an object of overwhelming existence on which to dwell. It is a center, a pivot, a fulcrum, a nucleus, a point of orientation, giving order & logic (!) to other aspects of the person and the person's life.

7. What is the healing power of faith? Everyone -- including the most faithful saint -- is prone to disease and disintegration. The integrating power of faith has healing power (108);
8. Why are faith, love, and action not external to faith? If faith is understood as the state of being U.C., then love & action are implied in it. If faith is wrongly understood to be a belief in things in the absence of evidence, one would naturally & wrongly understand love and action to be independent of faith (112). P.T. says there's not faith "in the quiet vision of God." The action has to do with reunion, with overcoming the separation. The desire of love & concern of faith are the same. It's joining together with that which you belong to and with, and from which you were estranged. If faith and love are separated, it means religion is deteriorating. 115: The expression or vocabulary of love is action. Faith implies love and love is the mediating force between faith and works. If one is concerned, one acts.
9. Compare eros and agape. They are qualities of love within each other; only when distorted do the conflict. Examples of distortion of eros might include "objectifying" the other person as a means to an end that is often to one's own temporary advantage, quite possibly pleasurable, but ultimately isolated & lonely -- is this the same as "using people?" A distortion of agape might take the form of needless self-sacrifice, subsuming one's identity in another. P.T. says the undistorted, true unity of the two is a sign of true love. With eros, agape is merely obedience to moral law, cold, w/o longing or reunion. Without agape, eros is chaotic desire, denying the validity of the claim of the other to be acknowledged as an independent self, able to love and be loved. They come in both ontological (abstract, philosophical) types and ethical (concrete & active) types; eros driving to union the lover with the beloved, in that which is beyond both. Agape drives one to acceptance of the beloved and the transformation of the one we love into what they can become. Loving not only what they are, but what they can become, what they will be, and making that journey with them. This is a big one, folks.

L. The Community of Faith & Its Expressions (Pages 117-127)

The idea of community is important to Tillich. Why? When you think about it, relate it to his ideas about reason (see my handout on Ch. 5), the idea of language, and the implication that faith requires expression to others and cannot exist in a vacuum. If it can't be communicated, it isn't faith, he suggests.

The forms -- symbols -- in which it can be communicated are all "language" of some kind or another. Letters on a page. Sounds spoken in a pattern. A dance handed down for many generations. A way to paint calligraphy in the blackest ink on the whitest rice paper. A chant, a prayer, a way to breath, a posture for sitting still, a path to walk through the countryside have all served as the language in different contexts and cultures. Language is the receiver and transmitter, referring to something huge, helping pull in its signal, and transmitting the message as best it can to those who want to hear. The many sounds and sights and movements of human beings are all language and all a part of the structure -- of "reason." They would not need to exist without other like-minded human beings -- without community. Thus the many languages we use are all a part of a community, without which Tillich says faith cannot exist.

To be "concerned" is to act, and P.T. says action only happens in a community. He goes on to say that the two types of expression of faith & Ultimate Conccern are the intuitive/mythical & the active/ritual, and they are interdependent, because in the myth the community is imagined, and in the ritual the vision is practiced or acted out. Intuitive or mythical, meaning the way a community of faith interprets itself & its U.C. in mythical symbols. Active or ritual, the way the community of faith constitutes itself through ritual symbol

So, the life of faith requires life in the community of faith -- in its activities, and inside each individual. The connections among community members is central. There is room for prolonged seclusion, as with monasteries, but it is always temporary. A possibly more controversial thought is that there is no such thing as community without faith -- a shared Ultimate Concern. If the shared concern is truly ultimate, it is not threatened by preliminary concerns, e.g., the Jewish faith and community, enduring the most horrific but temporary and "preliminary" concerns and threats in Nazi Germany. Interestingly, P.T. says that "literalism" can generate such a powerful opposing reaction that the community is eviscerated and becomes a virtually secular philosophy, with nothing much more than a moral code surviving. Such a development leads to further degeneration, according to P.T., as "clever calculation" replace the genuine passion of true faith. Another possible development is that symbol and myth can become distorted into forces of magic and superstition; a mechanical understanding replaces the deeper and more puzzling relationship called faith. In a reaction against this tendency to turn sacrament into superstition, the Reformation removed the genuine meaning of ritual, P.T. says, and moved Christianity toward the system of independent morals devoid of passion or the richness and depth of ritual rightly understood -- a powerful aspect of faith was essentially thrown out, having been corrupted in the eyes of Luther and others. But he says that Protestantism has begun to resuscitate the idea of sacrament and ritual, because faith is dead without them, and "experience of the holy" vanishes without them.

Similarly myth can't be understood literally, but as the powerful symbolic expression of the U.C., pointing to the U.C., irreplaceable by philosophies or moral codes.

Regarding tolerance, Tillich notes that the thing that gives rise to idolatry can also give rise to intolerance. The Ultimate expresses itself in such a way that it denies all other expressions. The key word here is "expressions." Is Tillich saying that all the varieties of religions are different ways of expressing the same Ultimate? That's a risky proposition.

The three Western traditions seem to make exclusive claims -- God's chosen people, or salvation through Jesus, or the revelation given by the Prophet, Mohammed. All three are intolerant of idolatry. They are concerned with justice, history, and to varying degrees, apocalypse. Thus Tillich suggests they can tend to be fanatical, idolatrous, and invariably intolerant of more mystical, more assimilating traditions. But here he may be dealing with enormous stereotypes, both toward Eastern traditions and by ignoring aspects of Western traditions.

A big related point on pg. 123: a faith must have a truly ultimate concern as its primary criterion, but it must be self-critical in that it understands the relative validity of its own symbols.

Regarding this idea of tolerance and faith confronting an alien faith, P.T. uses Christianity & secular belief (124). In encountering each other, two adequate responses are a) methodological inquiry into those elements of conflict which can be inquired into, and b) witnessing the elements of the conflict which drive one to change what or how one believes -- to "convert."

It's interesting on pg. 125 that P.T. suggests no faith will succeed in converting everyone else unless we learn to distinguish "ultimacy itself from that in which ultimacy expresses itself." It may require many symbols, recognized and respected, although all great religions hope to emerge as the one true universal religion. And he seems to think Christianity has the best chance.

Note that at the end. pp. 126 and 127, P.T. says those who reject faith misunderstand what is meant, since faith is "the central phenomenon" in a person's life-- universal, concrete, variable and the same, religious but more than religious, etc. Faith can't be undercut by modern science, or philosophy, superstition, authoritarian systems. In fact, in his fun-loving way, P.T. even says those who deny faith are expressing faith.